World of RESTCraft


An online buddy of mine drew my attention to Blizzard’s new Community API for World of Warcraft.  For those of you who aren’t familiar with World of Warcraft, it is a massive multi-player online role playing game.  They have millions of players.  The game is so successful and generates so much cash that Blizzard pays out a dividend to stock holders.  Not only do they have millions of players, there’s also a very large community around WoW.  The game itself has its own scripting language which you can use to write add-ons.  This add-on community is huge with thousand upon thousands of apps written.

There’s also a large variety of third-party sites that provide character and guild management, quest information, gear info, damage simulators, and gear optimization.  These types of tools need to access Blizzard’s databases.  This is where Blizzard’s new REST-based Community API comes.  Originally, a lot of these sites did screen scraping on WoW’s main website to grab information and access character management.  Since April, they’ve been developing and publishing a full read and write RESTful interface for their applications.  Its seems they picked REST because of the ease of integration between many languages.

Things to note

In browsing the API documentation here’s a few things that jumped out at me

Document by example

The first thing to note is that the API is documented by example.  Here’s the URL pattern you use.  This is what the HTTP request looks like.  This is the JSON data you should send, and this is what the JSON data looks like.  IMO, this is what REST API documentation should look like.  No WADL.  No schema.  Just plain, here’s what you can send, here’s what the request looks like.  This is the approach I’ve taken with my API documentation.  You gotta remember, the people that are going to be integrating with these APIs don’t come from SOAP-land, WS-*-land, CORBA-land, enterprise programming land.  All will understand HTTP and JSON pretty easily.  This is what I love about REST: “lightweight” interoperability with a very low barrier to entry.

Signature-based Authentication

Hackers are ruthless when it comes to World of Warcraft.  I myself was hacked once and had to get my account restored.  Blizzard is very careful about this as it creates a lot of support headaches for them.  You can use a soft-token via your smart-phone.  Or order and get an RSA-like physical token generator when you log into your game.  As for the REST api, you need to acquire a public and private key.  Authentication is done by hashing your private key along with the current time, URL, and HTTP method.

UrlPath = <HTTP-Request-URI, from the port to the query string>
StringToSign = HTTP-Verb + "\n" +
    Date + "\n" +
    UrlPath + "\n";

Signature = Base64( HMAC-SHA1( UTF-8-Encoding-Of( PrivateKey, StringToSign ) ) );
Header = "Authorization: BNET" + " " + PublicKey + ":" + Signature;

Amazon does something very similar for many of it’s public REST apis.  While not true a true digital signature (sigs are encrypted hashes and don’t include the private key), its very close, and a lot simpler to use and understand for users.

Not very link driven

Can you imagine this API being explained via a set of link publishings rather than a set of URI patterns?  I’ve taken advantage of HATEOAS, especially within the HornetQ REST API, but in many cases, just publishing the URI scheme can be very useful.  Maybe its data-publishing vs. interaction?  With a data-publishing app (WoW) it makes more sense to publish a URI scheme for your REST interface.  With an interactive application (i.e. HornetQ REST), HATEOAS, link-driven interfaces make a lot more sense and give you a lot more flexibility.


On one of the forum posts, the developer talked about how he/she planned to version the API in the future.  It seems that they will version using URIs.  The latest and greatest will always use the same top-level URI schemes.  If you want to tie yourself to an older version of the API, the URI scheme will be predicated ith a version identifier:

New API:


All and all it will be great to see this API evolve over time.  This will be a great public display of a REST API and it will be very interesting to see how Blizzard tackles various issues.  There’s a lot we can learn here.

They are guidelines not laws


I’m catching up on some blog reading.  A great blog on REST, if you don’t read it already, is Subbu Allamaraju‘s (in my blog links too).  I like to call him Dr. REST.  Back in May he wrote about Richardson’s Maturity Model and how measuring your APIs against the model is the wrong thing to do (I think he’s followed it up with a presentation).  I can’t agree more.  What I like about this model (and other articles like it) is that I like to compare it to my own history of growing my understanding of REST.  IMO, what you should do these models and guidelines is read them, examine them, see if they spark any ideas for improving your application.  They just might improve your understanding of REST and why certain constraints are good.  Don’t try to fit your API to REST.  Let REST help you write a better API.  Don’t apply REST for the sake of REST.  This is primarily why I unplugged myself from the rest-discuss mailing list.  If you treated applying REST as a set of guidelines instead of a set of laws you were castigated for it.  Wrong approach.

Anyways, as usual, great blog Subbu.  BTW, you should check out his book too.

Is anybody doing HTTP message signing and encryption?

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Over the past 6 months off and on I’ve been researching and prototyping various security related features for Resteasy.  One thing I’ve wondered is, is anybody really doing anything with HTTP message signing and encryption?  Email seems pretty well rounded in this area with specifications like DOSETA/DKIM and SMIME.  You could theoretically apply these specifications to HTTP, and I have, but I could find no examples of people doing so on the Web.  Maybe its just that my Google searching skillz are poor.

Another thing I’ve noticed is that the crypto libraries (bouncycastle and python’s M2Crypto) pretty much center around email as the protocol and you have to dive into the codebase a bit to figure out ways to transmit things over HTTP. Bouncycastle relies on javax.mail multipart implementation which is a bit limited and not very lenient on parsing (Didn’t like python’s SMIME output).

Anyways, I hope to do a Resteasy 2.3 beta soon with SMIME support.  With it I’ll have examples of Python clients posting to Resteasy services transmitting SMIME formated requests.  I’ll post a few blogs on the subject so you can see how to transmit SMIME between M2Crypto and Bouncycastle. (Python and Java).

In the meantime, does anybody have any experience in this area?

Resteasy 2.2.2 Released

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This is just a maintenance release to fix a few minor and critical bugs found by the community.  You can download 2.2.2 here.  Release notes are here.

Hopefully we can now focus on getting a 2.3 beta out the door.  Currently I’m working on S/MIME integration as well as a decentralized auth protocol discussed in previous blogs.

Decentralized Auth Ideas


Distributed workflow has to be the most complex use case to secure.  In it you could have multiple participants being coordinated both synchronously and asynchronously.  All forwarding and distributing information and data in between each other.  All needing to trust one another.  If you could define a relatively scalable and simple solution for workflow, you’d have something that would work in less complex scenarios.

The hub and spoke model that seems to be popular involves a central identity management provider (IDP) that participants ping to authenticate requests and to receive security information.  The biggest problem I foresee with this approach is that the IDP becomes a central point of failure.  The IDP needs to be available for applications to work.  It needs to be on the same network.  There’s a lot of extra distributed requests that need to be made.

All these problems bring me to thinking about the stateless principle of REST.  RESTful services can have state, but not session state.  The idea is that session state travels with the request.  Could we do something similar with security information?  Sure why not!  How could you trust the integrity of such information?  Digital Signatures.  I’m sure there are protocols out there that have thought of similar ideas, but its cool to think things out for yourself.  If your ideas match a particular existing protocol or specification you know you’re on the right track.  The idea have have works as follows.

Let’s pretend we have a User named Bill that wants to interact with a Travel Agent service that will buy a ticket for him on an airline, reserve an airport taxi, and reserve a hotel room.  So, Bill is interacting with the Travel Agent directly.  The Travel Agent is acting on behalf of Bill when it interacts with the airline, taxi, and hotel services.  The airline, tax, and hotel have to trust both the travel agent and Bill.

Step 1: Bill authenticates with an IDP saying he wants to interact with the Travel Agent.  The IDP returns metadata that specifies both Bill’s and the Travel Agent’s permissions for all the interactions that must take place.  It also returns the public keys for Bill and the Agent.  The IDP digitally signs all this information using its private key.

Step 2:  Bill sends a reservation request to the Travel Agent service.  Bill signs the request including the signed permissions and keys provided by the IDP.  Here’s what the request might look like:

POST /travel
Content-Type: application/reservation+xml
Authorization: doseta-auth user=bill;h=Visa:Permissions:Public-Keys:Host;verb=POST;path=/travel;bh=...;b=...
Visa: initiator=bill;h=Permissions:Public-Keys;;b=...
Permissions: bill="agent hotel airline taxi"; agent="reserve-hotel reserve-taxi reserve-flight"
Public-Keys: bill=23412341234;agent=3423412341234


Step 3: The Travel Agent authenticates and authorizes Bill’s request.  The Authorization header contains metadata that is signed by Bill.  The metadata signed by bill is the HTTP verb and path of the request (POST and /travel), and the hash of the XML posted by the request, as well as the Visa, Permissions, and Public-Key headers included within the request.  The Travel Agent verifies this signed metadata by finding and using Bill’s public key in the transmitted Public-Keys header.  If the signature passes, then the Travel Agent knows that Bill sent the request.  But….It does not know yet if Bill is a trusted identity.

Step 4: How does the Travel Agent know Bill is a valid person?  How does it know that Bill is allowed to make a reservation?  To answer these questions, the Travel Agent first looks at the transmitted Visa header.  What it boils down to is that the Travel Agent only trusts the IDP.  The Visa header was generated by the IDP and  is a digital signing of the Permissions and Public-Keys header.  The IDP  through the Visa header tells the Agent the permissions involved with the request and who will participate in the overall interaction.   The Agent only needs to know the IDP’s public key prior to the request being initiated.  So, the Agent verifies the digital signed Visa header using the stored public key of the IDP.  A successful verification also means that the Agent can trust that Bill initiated the request.  It can then look at the Permissions header to determine whether or not Bill is allowed to perform the action.

Step 5:  Next the Travel Agent needs to interact with the Airline, Hotel and Taxi services on behalf of Bill.  Here’s what a request to the Airline might look like.

POST /flights/tickets
Content-Type: application/ticket-purchase+xml
Authorization: doseta-auth user=agent;h=Visa:Permissions:Public-Keys:Host;verb=POST;path=/flights/tickets;bh=...;b=...
Visa: initiator=bill;h=Permissions:Public-Keys;;b=...
Permissions: bill="agent hotel airline taxi"; agent="reserve-hotel reserve-taxi reserve-flight"
Public-Keys: bill=23412341234;agent=3423412341234

You’ll notice that the Visa, Permissions, and Public-Keys headers are the same values as the original request made by Bill.  The Authorization header is different as the Travel Agent is making the request.  The airline services does authentication and authorization of the Agent’s request the same exact way the Agent did for Bill’s request.  Again, the key part of this is that only the IDP is trusted and only the IDP’s public key needs to be known ahead of time.


Disclaimer, I’m new to security so dealing and thinking about attacks is new to me.  Generally a lot of attacks can be prevented by specifying a timestamp and expiration with each sign piece of data.  Services can refuse to honor old requests.  Nonces could also be included within signature metadata to avoid replays.

User’s Private Key is compromised

User’s authentication with the IDP doesn’t have to be key based.  It could be TOTP based where the user has to login through his browser providing a password along with a device-generated time-based key.  The IDP could then return a temporary private key the client uses to sign requests.

IDP’s Private Key is compromised

This is a scary one.  Maybe it could be prevented by requiring and acquiring Visa’s from multiple IDPs?  A service would verify signatures from two or more IDPs.  The probability of more than one IDP’s private key being compromised becomes less and less the more IDPs you have involved with the interadtion.


So here’s a summary of this brainstormed protocol:

  • The Public-Keys header’s purpose is two-fold.  First, its a list of public keys.  More importantly it is a list of principles that are involved with the interaction.
  • The Permissions header is a list of permissions of each principle involved for each service they will interact with.
  • The Visa header is a digital signature of the Public-Keys and Permissions header.  It also will probably have a timestamp and an expiration as well (all digitally signed of course).
  • The Authorization header exists to verify the integrity of the HTTP request of the entity sending the request.  It is a digital signature of the HTTP verb, path, host, message body, Visa, Permissions, and Public-Keys headers.
  • The IDP is the only trusted entity in the whole multi-tier distributed interaction.
  • Each service must have the IDP’s public key stored at deployment time prior to servicing any requests
  • There is no communication to the IDP by any service.  Even the initiating client’s first interaction with the IDP to obtain a Visa could be done ahead of time and re-used for multiple interactions.

This is just a rough outline, but there’s probably other things that could be added.  Like nonce’s for instance.  Its just a matter of implementing it and getting people to use it.  The real question is, is there an existing protocol already out there that does this sort of thing?

Brainstorming REST Security Part I


If you went to my presentations at JUDCon/JBossWorld/RHS 2011 or read my recent blog posting you’ve probably noticed that I’m starting to focus on REST+Security.  This will be the start of a series of blogs that attempts to solidify a common vision around Security+REST and spec out what we’re going to do for RESTEasy and JBoss.

Internet Security is A Ghetto

One thing I’ve noticed is what a ghetto Internet security is, or even security in general.  There are old and new specifications, various industry collaborations efforts that succeed sort of (OpenID), start to succeed then have mutinies (OAuth), WS-* specs trying to bleed into the Web space (SAML), and promising specs that have had success in the email world (DKIM).  That’s just the small list of examples.  Its a freakin mess!  One common thread seems to be that most of them focus on providing security for the Internet (Internet with a capital ‘I’) and most have their roots in providing security for browser based apps.  Enterprise apps, while they can build off of security specs defined for the Internet, can often have very different requirements.  Web services can also have different requirements as well as a human (browser) may not be involved with client/server interactions.  In summary, I guess what I’m saying is that there are too many specs, no clear winners, too browser focused, and very little Enterprise focused.

What I’m trying to do with this and subsequent blogs is to brainstorm what high-level requirements for security enterprise apps should have, how can we make deployment of a security solution easier, what existing specs are applicable, what existing specs are open to input, what new specs have to be implemented, how can we make the protocols as easy to implement as possible in multiple languages, and finally, how can we design security services to make it as easy as possible to deploy to our Enterprise applications.

If I had to deploy a security solution…

A security solution I’d like to have would take enterprise as well as the difference between browser and non-browser clients in mind.  Its gotta balance strong security with ease of deployment, ease of use, and ease of implementation.  Many of these will be obvious, but I want to write it down.

  • For browser based clients I’d to authenticate using a user password and a one-time-password (OTP) generated by a soft or hard token generator.  Plain passwords are just not viable.   I myself have had both my GMail and World of Warcraft accounts hacked.  A combo of password + random key allows users to have simple to remember passwords yet be secure enough not to get hacked.  With smart phones like iPhone and Android, its easy to acquire a soft key generator (or implement one) without paying RSA an arm and a leg.
  • After authentication, the browser client should obtain an expirable cookie that it forwards with each request that contains authentication information the server will use to authenticate subsequent requests.
  • For non-browser clients,  I like the idea of digitally signed requests.  Verification of a digitally signed request would be the authentication mechanism.  What’s good about this (like the OTP of browser-based clients) is that credentials are different per request in that they are part of the attached signature.  A nonce and/or an expiration can be included within the digital signature to avoid replay attacks.
  • I foresee the need for non-browser clients to make requests on behalf of other services to other services.  Attaching multiple signatures to a request might be the way here.
  • It would be really cool to have a decentralized way to to both authenticate and authorize.  The hub and spoke approach that Picketlink STS uses creates a bit of a single point of failure and can require extra network round trips.  This decentralized mechanism should be able to work in an environment where services are making requests to other services on behalf of one or more identities.
  • A user had a really interesting case where they wanted to provide access to content through signed URLs.  The idea is that they would generate a signed URL and email it to a user to click on.  Very interesting.

Applicable Specs

Here’s some specs that I thought of off the top of my head that could be useful.  If anybody has ideas of others, let me know.

  • Time-based One Time Password Algorithm (TOTP).  Anil already did some work in Picketlink to implement this protocol.  We still need to integrate it as a Authenticator Valve in JBossWeb.  There’s also a nice iPhone app that supports TOTP.  I actually forked and re-implemented a lot of it on my own when I was learning Objective C a few months ago.  We’re looking at creating an Apple App Store account to distributed this forked implementation so we can brand it Red Hat.
  • SAML.  This may be what we need to do decentralized authorization.  I’m not fully versed in the spec, but I have read up on their HTTP bindings.  I’m not sure if there is any way to tunnel assertions through an HTTP header. (We don’t want to send SOAP requests).  If we can use SAML, we can piggyback off of a lot of the efforts already done in the Picketlink project.
  • Doseta.  I’ve already blogged about this protocol.  Using DNS to distribute keys is a little weird, but cool.  I’m asking that working group for this spec to break out Doseta into a few different specifications so that we can re-use the signature calculation algorithm in a standard way and to also make DNS public key publication optional and maybe also to provide an HTTP way to distribute keys.
  • Amazon REST Authentication.  Specs out how to sign URLs.  Maybe this could be standardized at IETF.
  • OpenID.  OpenID seems interesting for decentralized authentication, but I’m not sure if it can be used as a mechanism to do decentralized authorization.  OpenID is also more of a browser-based technology.
  • OAuth.  OAuth has both browser and non-browser bindings.  OAuth 2.0 pretty much leaves out what a token looks like.  I also don’t really want a token based system for non-browser clients

Possible Middleware Services

Here’s some ideas for services/integration we would implement.

  • HTTP Identity Proxy.  While implementing just an HTTP Proxy Cache is boring what might make these feasible is applying Identity to the mix.  This would delegate authentication and even authorization to an outside service.  Requests would be authenticated/authorized through the proxy, digitally signed, then forwarded to the target service.  The target service then only need to verify the signed request using the public key of the proxy.  While there’s obvious performance drawbacks, what’s interesting about this is that the application doesn’t have to think much about security and it could possibly be added even after the service is deployed.
  • TOTP Authenticator Valve.  Nuff said…I tihnk Anil already has this.
  • Better Auth integration with JBossWeb and the JBoss Security Domain abstraction.  Right now there’s just too many steps to enable things.
  • Various auth plugins for JBossWeb to realize our vision here.

Resteasy 2.2 Released


After baking in the oven the last few months, Resteasy 2.2 has been released to the world and is available for download.  You can view our documentation here.  We fixed a lot of bugs since the 2.1 release which can be viewed in the release notes of previous beta and RC releases:

Features wise we’re starting to focus on security solutions for RESTful web services.  In this release we focused on a digital signature framework based on DOSETA and DKIM.  I wrote a blog a few months ago about some possible use cases for digital signatures.  It will be interesting to see how people use our digitial signature framework, but more importantly how and if they want to use the DOSETA and DKIM protocols for digital signature propagation.  We are extremely interested in feedback and suggestions for improving the protocol and how it might solve (or not solve) any security use cases you might have.

Beyond that, writing the digital signature framework also helped to flush out the Resteasy interceptor API.  For instance, we found that it was very useful to hold off marshalling header objects into string formats until the stream is written to.  This allowed us to pass information through header objects to the interceptors that are performing signing and verification.  Writing down these requirements will be very applicable to the JAX-RS 2.0 JSR as we’re currently focusing on interceptors there.

What’s Next?

Further 2.x releases will focus mainly on adding security features.  We’re also going to be developing Resteasy 3.0 in parallel.  Here’s some points:

  • message body encryption with both multipart/encrypted and develop a new Content-Encoding. This will also help us flush out interceptors more I think
  • SAML/Picketlink. I think we may be able to integrate with SAML, specifically Picketlink to provide some hub/spoke authentication/authorization.
  • Clean up our OAuth support.
  • JAX-RS 2.0 has started which we will implement in Resteasy 3.0. The client API is shaping out and I might deliver a prototype of it when the next revision is submitted by the JAX-RS spec leads.

Investigating DOSETA(DKIM) For Signatures

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Recently I blogged about my proposed Content-Signature header for transmitting digital signatures.  I created a Internet Draft and submitted it to the IETF.  After a bunch of discussions with some helpful folks on the IETF HTTP WG list, I found that email already has such a system called Domain Keys Identified Mail (DKIM).  Its designed specifically for email messages, but some work is being done by David Crocker  and friends to make it applicable to other protocols via the DOSETA specification.

One particular interesting feature is how public keys are discovered.  Basically DNS names are used for identity and acquiring public keys for verification is just a matter of getting a text record from a particular domain.  It sounds exciting because even in an IT organization you could have distributed non-centralized authentication and authorization. DNS gives you a structure so that you could authorize a whole domain of users or one user at a time.  It would be interesting to be able to see how this structure could be mapped onto a URI instead too.

So, my short lived support for Content-Signature in Resteasy 2.2-beta-1 will be retired and I’m going to look into using DOSETA instead for 2.2.Final.

HornetQ 2.2.2 Released (Has latest REST interface)


HornetQ 2.2.2 has been released.  The HornetQ REST interface is now distributed and bundled with it.  The source code has also moved to the HornetQ SVN.  Visit for more details.

Multiple uses for Content-Signature


After describing Content-Signature in my last blog, it was picked up by InfoQ.  Also had a great private email exchange with Jean-Jacques Dubray in which we discussed various usecases for signature protocols.  Firstly, before I dive in, a disclaimer.  I am not a security expert and don’t pretend to be one.  While I have used various authentication and authorization protocols over the years, I have not been a designer or implementer of them.  So, here’s some use cases for Content-Signature:

The NULL Use Case

I think one of the most important aspects of something like Content-Signature is that this information can be ignored by any party in the request/response chain.  The signature becomes just another thing that describes the entity being passed around.  Why is this important?  I’ll give a simple example first, then later in the blog a more complex one.

Consider a simple blog.  Let’s say I posted some really stupid comment on somebody’s blog.  Its actually very easy to impersonate somebody in the comments section of anyone’s blog.  So, if a reader read my stupid comment and thought “Did Bill Burke really say that?!?”, how would they know if I really did post or not?  While not that practical in reality, what I could do is sign each comment I made to a blog.  That way, a reader could verify my signature if they so desired.

What’s interesting about this use case is that the blog itself doesn’t care about the signature.  Nor do most comment readers care about the signature.  Only a specific party cares about the signature.  With a header based approach like Content-Signature, renderers can completely ignore the signature applied to the comment if they do not care or understand how to process it.  This is why something like Content-Signature is better than multipart/signed, IMO.  Another interesting thing is that if the blog moved, lets say from Blogspot to WordPress, the import could take along the comment signature with it.  Even though the comment is served under a different URL, the signature is still valid.

Authentication, Authorization, and Message Integrity All In One

Another use for Content-Signature is that it could be used for authentication, authorization, and message integrity, all at the same time.  When a server received a request signed with Content-Signature, it could look into the metadata of Content-Signature to determine the signer.  (This assumes a asymetric key-pair solution)  Look up the public key of the signer in private registry.  Verify the signature with this public key.  If it is successful, the server knows a) that it is the signer that sent the message, and b)that the integrity of the message is good as well.  Now that the identity of the signer is known and valid, the server can determine internally whether the signer is authorized to make the request.  Because Content-Signature is flexible and allows you to add as much metadata as you wish to the signature, additional information like the request URL, a timestampe, a NONCE, whatever could be added to create a more secure process.

Approval Process

Consider a vacation request application.  An employee creates a vacation request form.  Signs it by adding a Content-Signature header and posts it to his manager.  The manager reads the request form, signs it, forwards the document and appends his signature to the Content-Signature header.  Forwards the doc and the new Content-Signature header to HR.  HR knows both parties approved of the document and processes the vacation.


Consider a simple order entry workflow where each phase of order fulfillment needs to happen in a specific order.  Each phase also needs to know that the previous phases really happened.  i.e. don’t ship the product until it has been payed for.  It could work like this:

  1. Customer posts order to order-entry system.  Signing it with his information.
  2. Order entry verifies signature.  It also adds an additional signature “order-entry” which is customer-sig+message body.
  3. Billing gets the order next.  It verifies the customer signature and that the “order-entry” signature.  Because “order-entry” was created with the customer-sig and message body, the billing system knows that the order is valid and that the exact order was looked at by the order-entry system.  The Billing system signs the message with customer-sig+message body.
  4. Shipping gets the order next.  It verifies the customer and billing signatures and ships the product.

Ignorant Gateways and Authorization of Actions

Another use case that JJ talked to me about is the ignorant gateway scenario.  Imagine an application that would listen to your twitter messages and forward these messages, via SMS, to your friends’ mobile.  You would automatically be billed instead of the application forwarding the tweets.  In this case, Twitter is the ignorant, pass-through, gateway.   It knows nothing about the whole authorization process.  In an imaginary world, this is how it could work:

  1. You post a twitter message.  You sign (“AT&T Auth Code” + “timestamp” + “message-id” + message body) and attach it as a signature to the method.
  2. The App is listening to twitter.  Does an SMS of message and sends along signature too.
  3. AT&T gets the SMS, looks at the signature.  Verifies it came from the user.  Because the “AT&T Auth Code” is part of the signature, AT&T knows that “Bill Burke” sent the SMS.  Since the “timestamp” and “Message-id” are part of the signature, AT&T can check to see if the SMS is a duplicate.  If all of these pass, then AT&T can bill “Bill Burke” instead of the App for the SMS.

This is also an example of authorization of a specific action via a signature.  I dont think you need separate signatures for each action you want to authorize.  It can just be a matter of concatenating multiple auth-codes within the same signature.  The hole in this approach is that hostile apps could trick users into adding an authorization to their signatures. i.e. “pay-me-$20-from-your-bank-account”.  This is why it is important for providers be involved in authorization code creation.

Complex Workflow

A complex workflow could combine some or all of these use cases together with the coordination of many different applications.


What it boils down to, is that, IMO, something like Content-Signature gives you a lot of flexibility when defining a distributed interface.  It allows you to combine metadata about a representation to the signing of a representation.  Because it is a header, it can be ignored if desired.  Since it is a set of simple name value pairs, it is very easy to create and parse.  (Well, depending on your platform, actually signing the message might be difficult, but, hey…).  Personally, I’m very interested in applying signatures to the RESTful interface we’re creating for our workflow engine.  Signatures just seem like a simpler way to manage multi-tier authentication and authorization.  Who knows, maybe I’m wrong here…

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